Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information

In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Herv\'{e}s-Beloso and Moreno-Garc\'{i}a, we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce.Comment: 23 page

Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information

In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce in [20].Asymmetric information; Exactly feasible; Ex-post core; mixed economy; NY-fine core; NY-private core; Robustly efficient allocation; NY-strong fine core; RW-fine core; Walrasian expectations allocation

On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

In this paper, we establish two different characterizations of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition in an asymmetric information economy having finitely many agents and states of nature and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. The first one deals with Aubin non-dominated allocations, and the other claims that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if it is not privately dominated by the grand coalition, by considering perturbations of the original initial endowments in precise directions.Asymmetric information economy; Aubin non-dominated allocation; Private core; Privately non-dominated allocation; Properness; Walrasian expectations allocation

Generalized metric properties and kernels of set-valued maps

AbstractWe study some generalized metric properties near to stratifiability. It is shown that every upper semicontinuous set-valued map from a G-space into a k-semistratifiable space has a compact kernel at every point of its domain

Bornoligies, Topological Games and Function Spaces

In this paper, we continue the study of function spaces equipped with topologies of (strong) uniform convergence on bornologies initiated by Beer and Levi \cite{beer-levi:09}. In particular, we investigate some topological properties these function spaces defined by topological games. In addition, we also give further characterizations of metrizability and completeness properties of these function spaces.Comment: 15 page

Wijsman Hyperspaces: Subspaces and Embeddings

In this paper, topological properties of Wijsman hyperspaces are investigated. We study the existence of isolated points in Wijsman hyperspaces. We show that every Tychonoff space can be embedded as a closed subspace in the Wijsman hyperspace of a complete metric space which is locally R.Comment: 6 page